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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
This paper addresses the welfare effects of conditional grants when there is government fail-
ure on the subordinate (hereafter regional) level. Government failure on the regional level 
may occur due to the influence of regional pressure groups and bureaucrats, poorly informed 
regional voters, lacking incentives to imitate superior solutions from other regions and ideo-
logical preference of regional governments.  Regardless of the origin, government failure 
leads regional authorities to apply inadequate policy solutions in policy fields where they have 
the autonomy to choose between different solutions. In order to set incentives for the regions 
to apply (more) adequate solutions, the supra-ordinate government may not use orders. How-
ever, conditional grants distributed upon application may be an appropriate means. They initi-
ate a competition for grants in which the regional authorities offer to apply superior policy 
solutions in order to attract conditional grants. On the other hand, substantial resources are 
used up for grant-seeking.  This paper provides a theoretical model to assess the net effect on 
welfare. Increasing the share of conditional grants and lowering the share of potential recipi-
ents increases both changes in policy solutions and grant-seeking expenditures. We show that 
there is an optimal grant-distribution scheme that maximizes net welfare. It depends on the 
preferences of the regional authorities, the number of regions, the regional production func-
tion and the total funds available. When regional disparities in output are irrelevant, condi-
tional grants are always efficiency-enhancing. The optimal share of conditional grants is 
higher the higher the potential gains while concentrating all means to a small number of re-
gions is never optimal because it boosts grant-seeking effort. If interregional disparities mat-
ter, the welfare-maximizing share of conditional grants is much lower, in many cases even 
zero. At the same time, grants are optimally concentrated to a small number of regions. Wel-
fare gains are larger when the central government can limit the social costs of grant-seeking 
through credible institutional arrangements (e.g. double-blind grant allocation procedures, 
application fees). In any case, conditional grants should be restricted to situations where a) the 
potential recipients are free in their choice of policy solutions and policy changes can only be 
achieved by appropriate incentives and b) the requirements to apply ex post performance 
based grants are not met.  
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die vorliegende Arbeit befasst sich mit den Wohlfahrtseffekten von Zweckzuweisungen bei 
Staatsversagen auf der untergeordneten Ebene (hiernach Region). Dieses kann auf fehlende 
Innovationsanreize, auf den Einfluss von Interessenverbänden und Bürokraten, auf verzerrte 
Wählerpräferenzen oder auf ideologisch geprägte Parteipräferenzen zurückgehen. Unabhän-
gig von der Ursache hat regionales Staatsversagen ineffiziente Politik-Lösungen in den Poli-
tikgebieten zur Folge, in denen die regionale Ebene über die Auswahl der Lösungen entschei-
det. Zur Verringerung des Staatsversagens kann eine übergeordnete Institution in diesem Fall 
keine direkten Befehle anwenden, sondern sie muss Anreize setzen. Indem sie Zweckzuwei-
sungen auslobt und auf Antrag vergibt, initiiert sie einen interregionalen Wettbewerb unter 
den potentiellen Empfängern. Diese werden die Anwendung verbesserten Politik-Lösungen 
anbieten, um ihre Chance of Zweckzuweisungen zu erhöhen. Diesem wohlfahrtssteigernden 
Effekt stehen allerdings Wohlfahrtsverluste durch regionales Grant-Seeking gegenüber. Das 
vorliegende Papier stellt ein theoretisches Modell vor, welches beide Effekte berücksichtigt. 
Generell gilt, dass eine Erhöhung des Anteils an Zweckzuweisungen und eine Verringerung 
der Anzahl potentieller Empfänger sowohl den Grant-seeking Aufwand als auch die Bereit-
schaft erhöht, bessere Politik-Lösungen anzuwenden. Wir zeigen, dass es ein optimales Zu-
weisungs-Verteilungssystem gibt, welches die Nettowohlfahrt maximiert. Es wird bestimmt 
durch die Präferenzen der regionalen Agenten, die Anzahl von Regionen, die regionale Pro-
duktionsfunktion sowie durch die Summe der insgesamt verfügbaren Mittel. Spielen interre-
gionale Output-Disparitäten keine Rolle, so sind Zweckzuweisungen auf Antrag stets wohl-
fahrtssteigernd. Ihr optimaler Anteil an den gesamten Zuweisungen ist umso höher, je höher 
die potentiellen Wohlfahrtssteigerungen sind.  Dabei ist es niemals optimal, die Mittel auf 
wenige Regionen zu konzentrieren. Sind regionale Disparitäten von Belang, so ist der optima-
le Anteil von Zweckzuweisungen deutlich niedriger, nicht selten liegt er bei 0. Zugleich ist 
eine strikte Konzentration der Mittel auf wenige Regionen optimal. Weitere Wohlfahrtsge-
winne sind erreichbar, wenn die vergebende Regierung die sozialen Kosten des Grant-
Seeking durch glaubwürdige Institutionen begrenzen kann (insbes.  doppelt-blinde Vergabe-
prozeduren, hohe Antragsgebühren). In jedem Fall ist die Verwendung von Zweckzuweisun-
gen aber nur angebracht, wenn a) die potentiellen Empfänger die Politik-Lösungen autonom 
wählen können und somit verbesserte Lösungen nur durch Anreize induzierbar sind, und b) 
erfolgsabhängige ex post Zuweisungen nicht anwendbar sind.  
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Abstract 
The paper addresses the welfare implications of conditional grants if government failure leads 
to inefficiencies in the production of regional public goods and services. Conditional grants 
may improve welfare by setting incentives for regions to improve efficiency. At the same 
time, resources are wasted in the process of grant-seeking. This paper provides a theoretical 
model to assess the net effect on welfare. A three-stage game-theoretic context is developed 
and simulations are performed to derive the optimal grant-distribution scheme. We found 
conditional grants to be welfare-enhancing in the vast majority of simulated scenarios under a 
classical utilitarian welfare function. Once distributional concerns are accounted for, the scope 
for conditional grants becomes limited.  
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 1. Introduction  
This paper wants to contribute to the literature on the political ecnonomy of intergov-
ernmental grants. A number of authors provide evidence that supra-ordinate governments 
apply vertical grants to maximize political support (e.g., Grossman, 1994, 1996; Worthington 
and Dollery 1998). Especially the discretionary freedom in conditional grants is used to this 
end. The current paper focusses on the behavior of the recipients of grants on the subordinate 
level. Following Tullock (1980), conditional grants evoke wasteful grant-seeking among 
them. On the other hand, conditional grants may help to improve (productive) efficiency on 
the subordinate level. The efficiency-enhancing effect in the case of regional spillovers has 
been discussed in depth (e.g., Oates, 1999; Shah, 2006; Fenge and Wrede, 2007). This paper 
concentrates on inefficiencies that result from regional or local government failure (e.g., Cher-
nick, 1979; Grossman and Mavros, 1999; Byrnes and Dollery, 2002; Oates, 2005) and the 
potential welfare-improvements inductible through conditional grants. Government failure on 
the sub-ordinate level can have a number of reasons. First, it may be attributed to the influ-
ence of pressure groups which press the regional or local authorities to apply inefficient solu-
tions because these suit group members (e.g., Austen-Smith, 1997; Oates, 2005). Second, 
when the electorate does not punish the authorities for poor policy outcomes, these lack incen-
tives to imitate superior policy solutions from other constituencies. Instead, they stick to over-
come solutions (e.g., Oates, 1999; Belleflamme and Hindriks, 2005). Third, the electorate 
may be poorly informed and follow biased or false beliefs as to which policy solutions are 
most suitable. In order to win elections, parties offer popular yet inefficient solutions (e.g., 
Romer, 2003; Bischoff, 2008). Fourth, inefficient solutions may reflect the preferences of the 
bureaucracy in charge of providing the goods or services (e.g., Niskanen, 1971; Wintrobe 
1997; Chang and Turnbull, 2002). Regardles of the underlying cause, government failure 
leads regional or local authorities to apply inedequate policy solutions.  
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One obvious instrument to reduce government failure is performance based grants (e.g., 
Crain and O’Roark, 2004; Flynn, 2007). For some public tasks, however, suitable perform-
ance measures are missing or other requirements for applying performance based grants are 
not met. It may nevertheless be possible differentiate between policy solutions that promise 
preferential outcomes and those that yield poor results. This opens the opportunity for the 
supra-ordinate government to restrict conditional grants to those subordinate regions that ap-
ply relatively superior policy solutions. For this purpose, conditional grants are granted upon 
application. Therein, the subordinate authorities specify the policy solutions they intend to 
apply. Given the large number of applications, the sum of funds applied for regularly exceeds 
the means that the supra-ordinate government reserved for this purpose. Thus, some applica-
tions have to be turned down. It is precisely this competition that sets incentives for the sub-
ordinate authorities to improve efficiency in order to attract grants.  
In this paper, we provide a model of this competition for grants that accounts for its 
welfare-enhancing effect as well as for the welfare losses due to grant-seeking. We argue that 
the net effect on welfare depends on the design of the grant-distribution scheme. The follow-
ing section 2 presents the model and shows how the optimal grant-distribution scheme de-
pends on the characteristics of the grantees, the number of sub-units, the production function 
and the total funds available. Section 3 presents three extensions to the model. The results and 
their implications are discussed in section 4. In particular, we sketch the preconditions for the 
applicability of conditional grants as a means to reduce government failure on the subordinate 
level. Section 5 concludes.  
 3 
2. The model 
2.1 Agents, production function and game structure 
Consider a federation consisting of N regions. The regions are in charge of providing a 
certain public service X. The regional output depends on the resources used and the policy 
vector Ai. The latter describes the policy solution that the region i applies in the production of 
X.  Let the regional authorities in charge of regional production be risk-neutral and utility 
maximizing and let their utility function be given by the following expression:  
2( ) ( ( ) ) 0 ,= − − − < <oi i i iU a v b A A a bλ 1 (1) 
The utility is a positive function of the disposable budget (vi - λi) (e.g., Tullock, 1980; Win-
trope, 1997). Here, vi stands for the sum of grants region i receives while  λi is the amount of 
resources it devotes to the application for conditional funds. In addition, the regional govern-
ment is assumed to have policy preferences. Let  denote the regional government’s bliss 
policy vector that maximizes regional utility when conditional grants are absent. One possible 
way to think of  is to interpret it to be the policy vector which maximizes the support by 
regional interest groups. For example, Xi may represent the quality of the public schooling in 
a region i and the Ai describes the mix of policy measures applied in this field (e.g., teaching 
methods, facility structure etc.). Here, the regional union of teachers, the parents’ association 
or regional religious groups may try to exert an influence. In case voters do not punish the 
regional government for poor educational outcomes, 
o
iA
o
iA
o
iA  may represent some previously ap-
plied yet overcome policy solution which is not changed because change is costly. Alterna-
tively, the relevant regional electorate may entertain biased or false beliefs as to which are the 
most important skills, the most effective teaching methods or the best organisational struc-
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tures in education. In order to win the election, regional parties are forced to offer popular yet 
inefficient policy solutions. Finally,  may be thought of to yield the highest procedural or 
ideological utility to the regional bureaucracy and politicians if pursued. The larger the dis-
tance between  and  (
o
iA
iA
o
iA
o
i iA A ), the lower regional utility – other things equal. The pa-
rameter a captures the degree to which regional governments are budget-maximizing and b 
captures the strength of their policy preferences. 
Regions are assumed to be identical with respect to size, policy preferences, utility func-
tion and production function Xi(·).The higher (vi – λi), the higher Xi – other things equal. At 
the same time, the output depends on the policy vector Ai applied. Some policy vectors yield 
better results than others. Let Aopt denote the policy solutions that maximizes Xi for any given 
amount of (vi – λi). For reasons of simplicity, we hereafter assume that the elements of Ai are 
linearly dependent and thus every policy vector can be represented by a scalar. The scalar 
might be interpreted to be the intensity with which a certain general policy principle or para-
digm is followed. Thus, hereafter  and  and Aopt are scalars. We assume Ai ≥ 0 while 
Aopt >> Aio. In the relevant interval for our analysis, let the output of the regional service Xi be 
described by the following Cobb-Douglas-production function: 
o
iAiA
1( )q qi( ) 0i i i 1X v A q= − ⋅λ − ≤ ≤  (2) 
It is based on the assumption that a region that receives conditional grants will apply Ai task –
wide even when producing those parts of Xi that are not financed by conditional grants. This 
assumption will be dropped in section 3.1. We furthermore assume that the regional produc-
tion of X is financed solely by earmarked vertical transfers from the central government. The 
latter has a fixed amount of funds F to support the production of X. The parameter f denotes 
the share of funds transferred in form of conditional grants distributed upon regional applica-
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tion (hereafter conditional grants). The remaining (1-f) fraction of F is distributed as block 
grant of equal size to all N regions. Block grants are earmarked for the production of X but 
distributed without prior application.  
 Now consider the situation of the central government that aims at maximizing the over-
all welfare WF. Let us assume that the government follows a simple utilitarian welfare func-
tion. Its objective is then to maximize overall output for a given F F= . Given that regions 
are assumed to be identical, this in turn is equivalent to maximizing the average output:  
1
1 N
i
i
WF X X
N =
= = ∑  (3) 
If f = 0, regions do not spent any resources on grant-seeking (λi = 0). They will use 
vi = F/N on the production of X and apply oiA . For all values f > 0, the probability that a cer-
tain region i receives conditional grants is denoted by pi. It depends on λi, on Ai and on the 
corresponding λj and Aj of all other regions j ≠ i. The more effort the region i exerts in the 
process of applying for grants, the higher the probability of receiving them – other things 
equal. In addition, the probability is higher the more adequate Ai. Following Berry (1993), we 
assume that the process of grant-allocation can be modelled as if it was a random process in 
which K < N regions receive a grant of size Ff/K. Thus,  
(1 )
(1 )i
f F fF in the case of successful grant seeking
N Kv
f F else
N
−⎧ + −⎪⎪= ⎨ −⎪⎪⎩
 (4) 
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The probability pN that region i = N receives grants is given by the expression (Berry, 1993): 
1 1
1 2 1
1
1 2 1
K K N
i N i N i N
i i i N K
N K K N
i i i
i i i N K
p
π π π π π
π π π
− −
= = = − +
+
= = = − +
+ + + +
=
+
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
…
…
π
)i
  (5) 
with ( ), (i i GDFπ π λ α=  
and 0; 0i i
i GDF
π π
λ
∂ ∂> >∂ ∂  
In order to keep the Nash-equilibrium in grant-seeking tractable, we assume: 
( oi i i iA Aπ λ= − )  (6) 
The central government does not give conditional grants to regions that stick to their bliss 
policy vectors  or spend no resources on grant-seeking; that is hand in no application. 
Hereafter, let αi = Ai - 
o
iA
o
iA . αi represents the policy concessions of region i.  The more conces-
sions region is willing to make, i. e. the more it is willing to change its policy solution and 
approach Aopt, the higher pi, other things equal. In addition, pi increases in λi. 
The interaction of regional and central government can be modelled as a sequential 
game consisting of three stages: In stage 1, the central government sets f and K. In stage 2, the 
regional governments apply for conditional grants. In order to receive grants, they offer a pol-
icy vector Ai ≠  and spend scarce resources on grant-seeking. Both Ai and the grant-seeking 
effort λi depend on f and K. In stage 3, the funds are distributed and regions use these funds 
net of grant-seeking expenditures to produce X. We assume that there are no information 
asymmetries between regional and central government. In order not to destroy the chance to 
o
iA
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receive conditional grants in the future, regions receiving conditional grants will apply the 
policy vector Ai offered in their application. Regions that were not successful apply . In 
search for the welfare-maximum, the central government has to solve this game by backward 
induction. For this purpose, it is necessary to develop the region’s reaction functions to f and 
K Ai = Ai(f, K, ) respectively λi = λi(f, K, ) and to establish the expression for the corre-
sponding output Xi. Given these reaction functions, the maximization task of the central gov-
ernment reads as follows: 
o
iA
o
iA
o
iA
{ }
{ , }
rg max
f K
, a=f K WF   (7) 
2.2 Regional grant-seeking and the optimal grant-distribution scheme 
Given that all regions are identical, we assume that πi = πj ∀ i,j holds in the Nash-
equilibrium: Thus, the expected change in pi from an incremental change in λi respectively αi 
in the Nash-equilibrium is given by the following expressions (Berry, 1993): 
2
( ) (
2
)
i i
p N K N K
N N
i i
i i
π
λ λ π λ
∂ ∂ − −=∂ ∂=  (8a) 
2 2
( ) ( )
i i
p N K N K
N N
i i
i i
π
α α π α
∂ ∂ − −= =∂ ∂  (8b) 
To save notation, we will hereafter drop the subindex i to denote the single region. From the 
point of view of the representative region, the maximization problem is the following:  
( , )
. .
, 0
Max U U v
s t v
α
λ
λ α
=
≤
≥
 (9) 
For those cases where f > 0, their expected utility is given by: 
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2(1 ) (1 )[ ] ( ( ) )K f F fF N K f FE U a b a
N N K N N
λ α λ⎛ ⎞− −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛= + − + − +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝⎝ ⎠
− ⎞− ⎟⎠  (10) 
We apply a Kuhn-Tucker approach to solve the maximization problem of the representative 
government (e.g., Hoy et al., 2001:67pp.). The corresponding Lagrange-function reads:  
[ ] ( )Z E U vμ λ= + −  (11) 
The first-order conditions for a maximum in utility are given by: 
2 0Z p fF pa a b
K
α μλ λ λ
∂ ∂ ∂⎛ ⎞= − + − − ≤⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠  0λ ≥  and 0
Zλ λ
∂ =∂  (12a)
2 2 0Z p fF pa b pb
K
α αα α α
∂ ∂ ∂= − −∂ ∂ ∂ ≤  0α ≥  and 0
Zα α
∂ =∂  (12b)
0Z v λμ
∂ = − ≥∂  0μ ≥  and 0
Zμ μ
∂ =∂  (12c)
From expression (12b), we can derive the optimal policy concession α*: 
( )*
( ) 2
a fF N K
b K N K KN
α −= − +  (13) 
Ruling out the negative square-root as implausible, it is easy to see that α* > 0 as soon as 
f > 0 and – which is implied by the first condition – K < N. The larger a/b, i. e. the larger the 
relative weight of budget-maximizing in the regional government’s utility function, the larger 
α*. At the same time, α* increases in f ( * / 0fλ∂ ∂ > ) and decreases in K ( * / 0KαΔ Δ < ). 
In a next step, the optimal grant-seeking effort λ* is derived from expression (12a). As-
suming the restriction in (12c) to hold, we arrive at the following internal solution: 
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2
2 2
( )* 1
( ) 2
N K fF b N K fF N K
N K a N K N K KN
λ α ⎡ ⎤− −⎡ ⎤= − = − −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ − +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  (14) 
We can infer a strictly positive grant-seeking effort as soon as conditional grants are available 
(i.e. f > 0; K < N). The restriction in (12c) is satisfied if the following inequality holds: 
1
( )1 1
( ) 2
N K N Kf
NK N K KN
−⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤− −≤ + −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥− +⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
 (15) 
Figure 1 shows the critical values of f as a function of K and for two different values of N 
(N = 24, N = 100). In the most restrictive case where K = 1, the corner-solution applies for 
values of f > 0.6. As K increases, the corner-solution only applies to cases where almost all 
central funds are distributed via conditional grants. Restriction (15) becomes less restrictive as 
N increases.
1
 In those cases where it does apply, the grant-seeking effort is given by the limit 
λ = (1 – f)F/N. 
                                                 
1
  Where this restriction applies, the regional government faces incentives to set f very large to change the 
policy vector and at the same time limits the grants-seeking effort due to the restriction (15). Taking this 
argument to the limit, it will set a value of f just below 1. While this strategy is possible within the narrow 
world of the model presented here, it is unlikely to work in the real world because of the possibility to 
cross-subsidize grant-seeking by reducing expenditures on other public services. Incorporating this possi-
bility in the current model would require a number of additional ad hoc assumptions. As we will show be-
low, restriction (15) holds for virtually all realisations of the current model. The restriction applies only to 
cases with extreme parameter settings, e.g. for a ≈ 1. For these cases, we will hereafter assume that the 
central government will set f and K to the welfare-maximizing internal solution. The assumption can be 
justified by the fact that in those cases where restriction (15) applies, regions that do not receive grants 
witness Xi = 0 because they have no resources to spend on the program itself.  
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Figure 1: Critical values of f as a function of K (N = 24; N = 100) 
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Figure 2: Critical values for which * / KλΔ Δ  > 0 (highest value of K) 
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As long as restriction (15) holds, λ* increases in f ( * / f 0λ∂ ∂ >
K
) but is independent of a and 
b. For all situations where N > 4, the sign of * /λΔ Δ  changes from positive to negative as K 
increases, for N ≤ 4, * / 0KλΔ Δ <
* / K
 for all values of K. In general, positive signs can only be 
expected if the ratio K/N is small. For all values of K below the critical value depicted by the 
line in figure 2, λΔ Δ  > 0 (for values of N ≤ 200). 
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In sum, the Nash-equilibrium among regions derived here reveals an essential trade-off: 
Increasing the share of conditional grants improves overall welfare by causing the K regions 
that receive conditional grants to apply a more appropriate policy vector. At the same time, a 
concomitant increase in grant-seeking effort reduces welfare in all regions ( * / 0fλ∂ ∂ > ). A 
similar trade-off exists when the central government changes K because both α* and λ* de-
crease in K for the vast majority of cases. The net effect of changes in f and K on welfare thus 
depends on the production function for X.  
The central government aims at maximizing the expected output of the representative 
region: 
( ) ( )1 1(1 ) (1 )[ ] q qq qo oi iK f F fF N K f FE X A AN N K N Nλ α λ− −− − −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= + − + + −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠  (16) 
Its maximization problem thus reads:  
( ), *, *
. . 0
0 1
* ( , )
* ( , )
( , )
o
iMax WF X v A
s t K N
f
f K
f K
v v f K
λ α
λ λ
α α
= +
< <
≤≤
=
=
=
 (17) 
Due to the fact that K is an integer, we cannot apply a conventional Kuhn-Tucker approach to 
solve this problem.
2
 More importantly, we cannot derive general expressions for the welfare 
maximizing combination of f and K (hereafter (f*,K*)) and use these expressions to show ana-
                                                 
2
  In any case, the relevant derivatives would be to complex to allow an easy analytical interpretation.  
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lytically how (f*,K*) depends on the exogenous parameters a, b, oiA , q, F , and N. Instead, 
simulations are used to derive the combination of K and f that – given the regional reaction to 
these parametersand the restrictions on K and f – maximizes WF. In these simulations, we 
derive (f*,K*) for a specific parameter constellation and show how it changes if we vary pa-
rameters systematically. Table 1 shows the parameter values in the standard scenario.  
Table 1: Exogenous parameters in the standard simulation scenario 
Parameter 
o
iA  
a 
(b = 1 – a) N F  q 
Standard value 0.2 0.5 24 N 0.5 
 
In the standard scenario, simulations yield an optimal strategy of the central government 
(f*, K*) = (0.52, 9) and the corresponding average program output is given by X* = 0.514. 
Compared to the output of X0 = 0.447 that would emerge without conditional transfers (i. e. 
for f = 0), an optimally designed conditional transfer scheme can increase net welfare by 
14.9 %. The regional grant-seeking effort amounts to λ* = 0.035 and the change in the policy 
vector is given by α* = 0.216. The K regions that received conditional grants use resources 
equal to v – λ* = 0.48 + 1.387 – 0.035 = 1.82, the remaining N-K regions use v – λ* = 0.445. 
Their output is given by XK = 0.870 respectively XN-K = 0.298 (see table 2, appendix). 
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Figure 3: Simulation results for the variations in a for task-wide concessions  
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2.3 Simulating variations in exogenous parameters 
Starting from this standard scenario, we describe series of simulations to analyse the 
impact of different values for the exogenous parameters. First, we will turn to the relative 
weights of budget maximization in the regional utility function. The larger the corresponding 
parameter a, the larger the utility the regional government derives from the amount of dispos-
able budgetary means relative to the losses in utility they witness when deviating from . 
For any given scheme (f,K), α* and λ* increase in a. Our simulations show that the larger a is, 
the larger f*, the smaller K* and the larger the ratio of X*/X0 (see figure 3). The same basic 
pattern shows if we use other values of  q, or N (see table 2) instead of the standard values. 
For q = 0.75 and , the opportunity costs of grant-seeking are larger and the gains 
from policy vector changes are smaller. For this reason, f* is smaller than in the standard sce-
nario while K* is larger. The opposite is true when q = 0.25 or .  
o
iA
o
iA
0.5oiA =
0.1oiA =
The higher , the less severe the regional government failure, the larger X0 and the 
higher are opportunity costs of grant-seeking. Consequently, f* decreases and K* increases in 
o
iA
o
iA , leading to a reduction in α* and λ*. The opportunity costs of grant-seeking increase in q 
while the benefits from changes in the policy vector decrease. Thus f* decreases while K* 
increases in q. As a result, α* and λ* are reduced.  In simulations where N and F  increase 
simultaneously such that /F N =1, f* decreases in N as does the share of regions that receive 
conditional grants k* = K*/N. This causes α* and λ* to increase. From expression (14) and 
(15), it is easy to see that both α* and the grant-seeking effort λ* increase with the amount of 
funds available /F N  per region. From the perspective of the central government, the wel-
fare-improving responsiveness of α* is initially larger than the welfare-losses to increased 
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grant-seeking. As a consequence, f* increases in /F N  while the optimal number of recipi-
ents K* reduces only marginally.  
In a next step, we randomly generate 5000 possible parameter constellations and calcu-
lated the correlation matrix between these parameters on the one and f* and k* respectively 
α* and λ* on the other (see table 3, appendix). The purpose of this analysis is to see whether 
the relationship between the endogenous variables, in particular (f*, k*) and the exogenous 
parameters that we derived above remain valid when more than one exogenous parameter 
changes. These results are affirmative. The optimal values f* and k* are negatively correlated. 
Schemes with a high f*/k* ratio are found in those cases where the efficiency gain from con-
ditional grants (X*/X0) is large. As natural side-effects, these high-ratio schemes go along with 
high values for α* and λ* and a large ratio of XK/XN-K.  
3. Extensions 
3.1 Project-specific concessions 
So far, we assumed that – regardless of the share of conditional grants f – these grants 
make the successful K regional government apply the superior policy vector Ai in all the ac-
tivities that involve the production of X, that is concessions are made task-wide. In many 
cases, conditional grants are offered to support the regions in clearly defined projects and the 
regional applications describe only these projects and the policy solutions therein. In these 
cases, it is reasonable to assume that the policy concessions α are restricted to the specific 
project that is financed through the conditional grants whereas the regional government con-
tinues to apply Aio in the other activities funded by the block grant. To capture this effect, the 
utility function has to be changed because the utility losses due to deviations from Aio only 
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apply to a fraction of their activities. The simplest way to do this is by scaling the relevant 
utility losses with the size of this fraction: 
2' ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ) 0 ,
( )
= − − − < <+ −
o
i i i i
fNU a v b A A a b
K f N K
λ 1 (1’) 
This leads to changes in the first order conditions for a utility maximum on the regional level 
and to changes in α*. The new equilibrium value α*’ for the optimal concession is given by: 
( )( ) ( )* '
( ) 2
+ − −= − +
F K f N Ka
b KN N K K
α N K
N
 (13’) 
For any (f,K), α*’ is larger than α*. Their ratio increases in K/N and decreases in f: 
* ' (1 )1
*
−= + K f
fN
α
α  (18) 
For the grant-seeking effort, the expression for the equilibrium remains unchanged, i.e.  
λ*’= λ* (see expression (14)). In other words, the regional authorities are more responsive to 
conditional grants in their policy concessions but not in their grant-seeking expenditures. At 
the same time, the overall increase in output from a given concession α is lower than under 
task-wide concessions. Given the functional form of Xi(·), the necessary changes are not triv-
ial. For reasons of simplicity, we use the following modified expected output of the represen-
tative region: 
( )
1
1
(1 )[ ]
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Figure 4: Simulation results for variations in a for project-specific concessions 
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Expression (16’) implies that the output can be modelled as if the region applied a policy vec-
tor Ai’ that is a weighed average of  and oiA = + oiA α iA
1
 with the weight being region i’s share 
of conditional grants in gross funds. The optimization problem in expression (17) remains 
valid here. 
We reran the simulations from section 2.3 to generate the optimal grant-distribution 
scheme assuming project-specific concessions (see figure 4 and table 4; appendix). While f*, 
α* and the resulting ratios of X*/X0 and Xk/XN-K are generally higher than under task-wide 
concessions, the other variables show only minor changes. The general pattern of results is 
not changed. The same holds for other scenarios and for the simulations involving multiple 
parameter variations.
3
  
3.2 Distributional concerns 
One important side-effect of grant-distribution is the inequality in output between re-
gions that receive conditional grants and regions that do not. The ratio of XK/XN-K is a positive 
function of the welfare gains that can be achieved through conditional grants X*/X0 (ρ = 0.788 
for task-wide concessions; see table 3). The simplest way to account for distributional con-
cerns is by using the following modified utilitarian welfare function:  
( )K N KWF KX N K X withφ φ−= + − ≥  (19) 
The parameter φ gives the output in those regions that do not receive conditional grants a 
higher weight in the welfare function.  
                                                 
3
  We report only the major results in the paper. Additional tables and figures are available with the author.  
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We reran the major simulations in section 2.3 and 3.1 using this modified welfare func-
tion (see table 5 and 6, appendix). As can be expected, f* is a negative function of φ. An im-
portant difference emerges with respect to the optimal grant-distribution scheme (f*,k*): 
While corner-solutions were not observed under the standard utilitarian welfare function, they 
are quite frequent here. Table 7 reports on the number of corner-solutions and (f*,k*) under 
the 5000 simulations using randomly chosen parameter constellations. 
Table 7: Distribution of (f*,k*) for 5000 randomly chosen parameter constellations  
Task-wide concessions Project-specific concessions  
φ = 1 φ = 1.1 φ = 1.2 φ = 1 φ = 1.1 φ = 1.2 
Corner solutions f*,k* = 0 0.0 % 14.2 % 26,6 % 0.0 % 52.1 % 56.7 % 
Solutions with f* < 10 %  5.5 % 79.4 % 86.3 % 0.0 % 81.9 % 87.5 % 
Solutions with f* < 50 % 91.5 % 95.5 % 97.3 % 84.9 % 94.9 % 96.9 % 
Average f* 0.25 0.08 0.05 0.35 0.07 0.05 
Solutions with k* < 10 %  4.3 % 85.4 % 93.4 % 5.0 % 90.7 % 95.6 % 
Solutions with k* < 50 % 56.2 % 100 % 100 % 30.1 % 100 % 100 % 
Average k* 0.46 0.05 0.03 0.63 0.03 0.02 
Boundaries: 0.15 a 0.85, 0.15 q 0.85; 0.1 2;    2; 1 / 2; 12 N 132.oiA F N≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤  
For φ = 1.2, corner solutions occur in approximately 25 % of the cases with random 
multiple parameter variations for task-wide concessions and in more than 50 % for project-
specific concessions. In those cases when f* > 0, f* and k* is found to be substantially lower 
than under the standard welfare function. As a result of this strategy, the interregional inequal-
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ity in funds is smaller and so is the ratio XK/XN-K. Finally, we ran logit-regressions to explain 
the occurrence of corner solutions if φ > 1 (see table 8). Accordingly, corner solutions are 
more likely the lower a and larger N, q,  F , Aio and φ. 
Table 8: Logit-regression for 5000 randomly chosen parameter constellations 
dependent variable: P(corner solution for (f*,k*))  
Task-wide concessions Project specific  concessions  
φ = 1.1 φ = 1.2 1 ≤φ≤ 1.2  φ = 1.1 φ = 1.2 1 ≤φ≤ 1.2 
All with 
var. φ 
Intercept -10.72*** 
(0.5355) 
-10.86*** 
(0.414) 
-56.64*** 
(2.686) 
-11.76*** 
(0.480) 
-14.64*** 
(0.585) 
-38.27*** 
(1.635) 
-46.43*** 
(1.401) 
N 0.070*** 
(0.005) 
0.071*** 
(0.004) 
0.65*** 
(0.005) 
0.050*** 
(0.005) 
0.076*** 
(0.005) 
0.041*** 
(0.004) 
0.047*** 
(0.003) 
q 8.01*** 
(0.461) 
7.09*** 
(0.344) 
7.75*** 
(0.475) 
13.08*** 
(0.539) 
15.29*** 
(0.627) 
10.90*** 
(0.441) 
9.23*** 
(0.308) 
F  -0.046*** 
(0.003) 
-0.032*** 
(0.002) 
0.034*** 
(0.002) 
-0.031*** 
(0.002) 
-0.031*** 
(0.003) 
-0.026*** 
(0.003) 
-0.028*** 
(0.002) 
a -13.56*** 
(0.620) 
-8.65*** 
(0.370) 
-11.08*** 
(0.565) 
-9.73*** 
(0.457) 
-9.14*** 
(0.455) 
-8.38*** 
(0.383) 
-8.84*** 
(0.299) 
Ai0 7.06*** 
(0.306) 
6.46*** 
(0.219) 
7.081*** 
(0.325) 
9.73*** 
(0.340) 
10.21*** 
(0.367) 
25.68*** 
(1.263) 
7.32*** 
(0.189) 
φ       29.06*** 
(1.020) 
project-
specificity  
      5.90*** 
(0.1611) 
Likelihood-
ratio 
2688*** 3589*** 6149*** 5192*** 5231*** 4859*** 8747*** 
# obs. 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 10.000 
Pseudo-R2 0.658 0.620 0.826 0.750 0.765 0.702 0.7119 
(Standard error in parentheses); *** significant at the 1% level.  
3.3 Upper limits to the grant-seeking effort 
In the previous sections, high values of f and low values of k lead to higher concessions 
but also to more grant-seeking. Especially under the classical utilitarian welfare function, the 
optimal grant-distribution scheme is defined by moderate values for both parameters. If the 
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central could effectively limit grant-seeking to a certain level λmax, welfare may be increased. 
The advantage would be twofold. First, for the current optimal combinations (f*,k*), the 
grant-seeking effort would be lower whenever λ* > λmax. Second and more importantly, other 
grant-distribution schemes with higher f and lower k may become feasible. This section points 
at the potential welfare gains from an upper limit to λ = λmax. All other assumptions of the 
previous sections remain unchanged.  
As long as λ ≤  λmax,  the solutions described in the previous sections apply. For situa-
tions where the optimal grant-seeking effort according to expression (14) exceeds λmax, re-
gions cannot increase pi through additional grant-seeking but only through additional policy 
concessions. It can be shown that expression (8a) remains unchanged and thus the optimal 
regional responses to a given (f,k) regime in expression (13) and (13’) continue to hold. The 
usual simulations are used to identify the optimal grant-distribution scheme. Figure 5 and 6 
show (f*,k*) and (λ*,α*),  X*/X0 and XK/XN-K for a threshold value of λmax= 0.05 and the clas-
sical utilitarian welfare function. Once λmax applies, we observe a somewhat higher value for 
f* and a much lower value for k*.  For the modified welfare function, the threshold is much 
more restrictive because the optimal grant-distribution schemes apply low values of k* and 
thus produce a higher λ*.4 Overall welfare is higher than under unrestricted grant-seeking.  
                                                 
4
  The simulation results and additional information on other specifications are available with the author.  
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Figure 5: Simulation results for the variations in a (task-wide concessions, λmax=0.05) 
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Figure 6: Simulation results for variations in a (project-specific concessions, λmax=0.05) 
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4. Discussion  
The sections above show that conditional grants may be a suitable means of fighting 
government failure on the subordinate level. The optimal grant-distribution scheme is deter-
mined by the preferences of the regional authorities (described by , a) the number of re-
gions N, the regional production function (described by q) and the total funds 
o
iA
F . Under the 
classical utilitarian welfare function, the optimal share of conditional funds f* is strictly posi-
tive. It is larger, the larger the degree of government failure, the more budget seeking the re-
gional government, the smaller the number of regions involved and the more funds are avail-
able in total. In addition, f* is larger under project-specific than under task-wide concessions. 
However, when distributional concerns are accounted for, the optimal grant-distribution 
scheme either contains a very small share of conditional grants or no conditional grants at all. 
Here, project-specific concessions lead to lower conditional grants. Apart from that, the gen-
eral relationship between f* and the other variables is preserved. With respect to the share of 
recipients k*, our simulations reveal an interesting pattern: For the standard utilitarian welfare 
function, we found the larger the optimal share of conditional grants, the lower the optimal 
share of regions that finally receive grants. At the same time, a concentration of conditional 
funds on a very small share of recipients is never optimal. Under the modified utilitarian wel-
fare function, however, the optimal grant-distribution scheme concentrates a limited amount 
of conditional grants to a very small group of recipients. This keeps up the region’s willing-
ness to apply more adequate policy vector, albeit at the price of higher welfare losses from 
grant-seeking. 
The applicability of conditional grants depends on a number of preconditions (e.g., 
Chernick, 1979; Ferris and Winkler, 1991). First, the central government must be able to iden-
tify high-quality projects before these have been implemented. In many cases, this is done by 
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checking whether the potential grantees follow certain organisational and technological stan-
dards of production. Second, the granting institutions must be able to control that the stan-
dards are followed once the grantee received the funds. Third, there must be implicit or ex-
plicit sanctions for those grantees that do not follow the standards proposed in the application 
or provide a lower quality of goods and services. In many case, the threat to be banned from 
future competitions for grants is a very effective instrument to ensure compliance. Precondi-
tions 2 and 3 are not met if the distribution of information between regional and central gov-
ernment is highly asymmetric. In this case, opportunistic regional governments can apply  
regardless of the policy vector initially stated in the application without having to fear sanc-
tions (e.g., Boadway et al., 1999; Gilbert and Rocaboy, 2004). Consequently, conditional 
grants do not have any impact on the policy vector used. Given that they nevertheless evoke 
wasteful grant-seeking, the welfare effects of conditional grants are negative. 
o
iA
The fourth precondition states that there is not alternative instrument that fights gov-
ernment failure and reaches the same efficiency in output at lower administrative costs. In 
many cases, performance-based ex post grants are a suitable alternative. These funds are not 
granted upon application ex ante but are transferred ex post to regions that provide their pub-
lic with adequate and high-quality services (e.g., Oates, 1999; Crain and O-Roark, 2004). The 
granting central government does not have to supervise the standards of production because it 
is in the own interest of the regions to apply adequate policy solutions. The granting institu-
tion can restrict itself to measuring the output. More importantly, the incentives to apply more 
adequate policy solutions exist for all potential recipients because these increase the output 
and thus the chance of receiving additional funds later. In the case of conditional grants dis-
tributed ex ante, the efficiency gains are restricted to those institutions that receive grants. If 
reliable and manipulation-proof measures are available, ex post grants will incur lower admin-
istrative costs. However, they bear the danger of the proxies used to measure quality become 
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goals and this biases production towards applying inefficient solutions (e.g., Frey and Oster-
loh, 2006; Langford et al., 2006). If the necessary measures are not available or of limited 
quality, it is difficult to select the best-performing regions ex post. The selection procedure 
becomes vague and intransparent and the councils or bureaus that make the selection are sub-
ject to grant-seeking by regions as in the case of conditional grants. In this case, performance-
based ex post grants do not lower administrative costs. Regardless of possible advantages in 
administrative costs, ex post grants are only suitable substitutes for conditional grants if two 
preconditions apply: First, the grantee must have sufficient funds to provide advance finance 
even at the risk of not receiving ex post grants. Second, the ex post grants must follow the 
production in due time to ensure that the agents who choose the policy solutions can expect to 
benefit from ex post grants. If the time horizon does not reach this far and the funds are ex-
pected for a time in which the relevant officials do not expect to be in office any more, ex post 
grants do not provide the desired incentives. In the extreme case, they may even provide a 
disincentive to apply adequate policy solutions. Applying the argument of Tabellini and 
Alesina (1990) on the strategic use of public deficits to the current problem, a certain gov-
ernment may deliberately apply inadequate solutions if re-election is unlikely. The aim is to 
reduce its successor’s chance of receiving ex post funds (e.g., Persson and Svensson, 1989).  
Given that welfare-improving effect of limiting the social costs of grant-seeking, the 
following question becomes immanent: Is it possible to limit grant-seeking expenditures 
through institutional rules? With respect to the mere costs of preparing applications, the cen-
tral government may well limit the effort, e.g. by limiting the length of the application to a 
few pages and limit the number of applications per region. However, if the projects are com-
plex, limiting application length makes it more difficult to judge the quality of the proposed 
project. Moreover, the application is not the only effort-consuming activity. In addition, re-
gions may invest in public relations to improve their image or exert public pressure on the 
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central government to press them for grants (e.g., Tullock, 1993). These activities are beyond 
the control of the central government and thus are very difficult to restrict unless it can credi-
bly commit to ignore them. A credible commitment may be possible if the selection procedure 
is double-blind or outsourced to a neutral institution or by introducing. Another effective way 
to limit wasteful grant-seeking is to install an administration fee for every application. While 
it leaves the total grant-seeking expenditures λ* unaltered, it can restrict the degree to which 
they represent social waste.  
The fifth condition for the applicability of conditional funds refers to the central gov-
ernment’s motivation. In the previous sections, we assumed the central government to be wel-
fare-maximizing. That is, it is interested in the best achievable results on the regional level 
and takes grant-seeking as necessary costs of introducing efficiency gains. If, however, the 
central government is interested in extracting rents (e.g. McChesney, 1997; Page, 2005), it 
will set f > f* and k < k*. If rent-extraction is the only aim, f finds its limit only in expression 
(15). In the standard scenario, the rent-maximizing combination is given by f = 0.6, K = 1. 
Under task-wide concessions, the corresponding concessions (α = 2.19) are much larger than 
for (f*,k*) but the welfare gains are restricted to one winning region while all N regions incur 
grant-seeking costs of λ = 0.389. The welfare losses compared to a situation without condi-
tional grants are massive (X/X0 = 0.642).
5
  
The general question of how to design an optimal grant-distribution scheme under re-
gional government failure applies to many policy fields. Generally speaking, it applies to all 
situations in which a) the grantor cannot control the subordinate production directly through 
                                                 
5
  The numbers are largely identical if we assume project-specific concessions.  
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orders because the subordinate level is independent in its choice of policy solutions and b) ex 
post performance based grants are not applicable. In Germany, they apply to the system of 
financing construction facilities in higher education institutions (so-called Hochschulbau) – 
assuming that there is incentives for the regional authorities to favour an inefficient regional 
or between-disciplines allocation of funds. While regional governments control the state insti-
tutions of higher education and incur all running costs, the federal government provides the 
means of constructing the necessary facilities. Until 2007, the share of conditional grants dis-
tributed upon application was 100 %.
6
 The sum of funds applied for regularly exceeded the 
available funds and thus projects were turned down or the conditional grants was lower than 
the sum applied for and regions were demanded to fill in the gap. In the federalist reform of 
2006/2007, the system was changed. Currently, about two thirds of the funds are given as 
block grants and one third is granted upon application (e.g., Sachverständigenrat, 2006: 341-
342). This step can be expected to reduce the regional grant-seeking effort substantially.  
A mix of conditional and block grants is often used for the services provided are funded 
publicly but carried out by non-governmental organisations, e.g. church-based institutions that 
are active in the field of social welfare. Here, the carriers are free in their choice of policy 
solutions and possible inefficiencies may arise from their (ideologically co-determined) policy 
preferences and from the self-interest of their employees. In Germany, youth welfare policies 
provide an example for this. Here, the regions are in formally responsible but the relevant 
services are provided on the local level – a substantial part by religious and other non-profit 
organisations. Unlike in the “Hochschulbau”, the share of conditional grants was initially 
lower but has been increased considerably in recent years. This change follows the introduc-
                                                 
6
  The fact that they are matching grants does not limit the applicability of the above argumentation here.  
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tion of New Public Management in the German regions and an increasing importance of qual-
ity management within the non-profit organisations (e.g., Gresse, 1998). Given that distribu-
tional concerns may be very important in this field, the theory provides a note of caution con-
cerning conditional grants. They are only justified if efficiency gains induced by the competi-
tion for funds are substantial. In any case, substantial means are diverted to grant-seeking. 
Additional costs may result from the fact that conditional grants require evaluations. These 
bear the danger of crowding out the intrinsic motivation (e.g. Frey and Osterloh, 2006) espe-
cially among the employees in the non-profit organisations. An empirical analysis of the im-
pact of conditional grants on motivation and output in the field of youth welfare programs 
might be an interesting albeit challenging endeavour.   
5. Conclusion 
This paper addresses the welfare-effects of conditional vertical grants when regions are 
subject to government failure. Conditional grants can improve the efficiency of public produc-
tion but they also evoke wasteful grant-seeking. We use a three-step game-theoretic frame-
work to derive the welfare-maximizing grant-distribution scheme for the central government. 
This optimal scheme involves some share of funds to be distributed as conditional grants re-
gardless of the regional characteristics if the government aims at maximizing a standard utili-
tarian welfare function. Conditional grants are effective and thus should be used intensively if 
the regional government are budget-maximizers with loose policy-preferences. In order to 
induce substantial changes in the policy vectors among the recipient regions and at the same 
time restrict grant-seeking expenditures, conditional funds must be distributed among a mod-
erate share of regions. Concentrating funds to a very small group of recipients is never opti-
mal. This result does not hold for the case when distributional concerns are of importance. 
Here, corner solutions without conditional grants are optimal in a large number of cases. 
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Whenever conditional grants remain welfare-enhancing, they should be small in size and con-
centrated to a small number of recipients.  
Conditional grants must be considered in situations where a) the potential recipients are 
free in their choice of policy solutions and policy changes can only be achieved by appropri-
ate incentives and b) the requirements to apply ex post performance based grants are not met. 
Especially in the field of complex, long-term projects, the latter do not represent a true alter-
native to conditional grants. Here, the government must rely on setting incentives for regions 
to apply policy solutions that meet certain standards. In order to restrict the costs of grant-
seeking, it can set an application fee or make a binding commitment to make grant-seeking 
expenditures that go beyond the necessary costs of preparing the application ineffective.  
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